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OPTIMAL INVESTMENT IN INFORMATION SECURITY: A 
BUSINESS VALUE APPROACH 
C. Derrick Huang, Department of Information Technology and Operations Management, 
Florida Atlantic University, Boca Raton, FL, U.S.A., dhuang@fau.edu 
 
Abstract 
With increasing level of security threats and constant budget limitations, it is critical for a company to 
know how much and where to invest in information security.  To date, all of the studies—academia or 
practitioner—focus on risk reduction as the primary effect of security investments, assuming that they 
generate no direct business benefits.  However, some potential business values such as brand 
reputation and data stability are not only real but also quite important.   This study addresses related 
research questions and extends the existing model to take into account direct business benefits in 
optimizing security investments, filling a significant research gap.  As such, this research makes 
contribution to both theory development in information security management and management 
implications in practice. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 Managing information security has become an integral part of any company’s day-to-day 
operations.  In the ten year period leading to 2003, the number of security incidents reported to CERT 
increased from 1,334 to 137,529 per year (CERT, 2006).  Such incidents range from those by hackers 
with benign consequences, to attacks aimed at stealing valuable information, to cyber-terrorism.  To 
protect against such risks, organizations are investing heavily in information security-related products 
and services, in addition to the countless manpower and management attention dedicated to protecting 
the data and systems and recovering from virus infections and occasional breaches (Gordon et al., 
2006).  Given the high cost of information security and the fact that a “completely secure 
organization” is an insurmountable, if not impossible, goal in today’s networked economy, it is only 
natural for decision makers to wonder if their investments are made wisely and effectively.  It is 
therefore important for decision makers to be able to determine the optimal amount of investment, and 
a number of studies have been devoted to address this issue based on economic cost-benefit analysis 
(Gordon and Loeb, 2002; Hauske, 2006; Huang et al., 2008).  This approach, though widely adopted 
for evaluating IT investments, is complicated by the fact that the “return” of security investment does 
not come from increased revenues or decreased costs like other IT investments do, but from reduced 
security risks that a firm is facing (Alter and Sherer, 2004).  As a result, it is difficult for a decision 
maker to employ such economic models to determine if the level of information security investment 
of her company is appropriate, because its intended outcome is “nothing happened.”  This project is 
designed to fill the research gap by building a business-value model for evaluating optimal level of 
security investment that considers not only the risk reduction aspect but also the business benefits of 
such investments. 
 
2. RESEARCH BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 The research stream on the optimal level of information security investment began in the 
early 2000s.  In their seminal paper, Gordon and Loeb (2002a) analyze the economics of security 
investment for a risk-neutral firm by comparing the cost of the investment and the potential loss 
caused by possible security breaches.  They find that the optimal security investment would be far less 
than (with a theoretical maximum of 36.8% of) the potential loss if a security breach does happen, and 
that the optimal security investment does not necessarily increase with system vulnerability.  In 
extending the Gordon and Loeb model, Huang et al. (2008) adopt the expected utility theory to study 
the behavior of a risk-averse decision maker and find that there exists a minimum potential loss for 
non-zero optimal information security investment; above that minimum, optimal investment increases 
with potential loss.  In addition, contrary to the risk-neutral case, a risk-averse decision maker may 
continue to invest in information security until the spending is close to (but never exceeds) the 
potential loss.   
 After the amount of investment is determined (by optimization, budget, or other constraints), 
a firm needs to decide what security measures to invest in.  Often, selection of the right investments is 
aided by traditional management tools as cost-benefit analysis (Gordon and Loeb, 2006) and financial 
analyses based on such measures as return on investment (ROI), net present value (NPV), and internal 
rate of return (IRR) (Pursor, 2004, Gordon and Loeb, 2002b).  Studies have proposed other decision 
analysis methodologies for selecting the right security investments.  For instance, analytic hierarchical 
process (AHP) employs pair-wise comparisons among different security technologies to determine the 
priority of implementation (Bodin et al., 2005).  Arora et al. (2004) propose to value security 
investments by associating bypass rate with each of the security technologies adopted at a firm.  
Alternatively, the issue of selecting and prioritizing security technologies can be treated as optimizing 
the allocation of the limited security investment.  Taking such an approach, Huang et al. (2006) 
propose an analytic model for security investment allocation that considers simultaneous attacks from 
multiple threat agents with distinct characteristics.  Their analysis shows that a firm is better off 
allocating most or all of the investment to defending against one type of attack when its security 
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budget is small.  Further, a firm should focus on technologies against targeted attacks when its 
information systems are highly connected. 
 A common modelling technique adopted by all of the studies in this body of research is the 
traditional decision analysis by comparing the economic cost and benefit of information security 
investments.  The benefits of such investments mainly come from the reduction of a firm’s security 
risks, which is formulated as security risk = (likelihood of loss event) * (cost of loss event) (Schechter, 
2005).  This approach, though widely adopted, implicitly assumes that investments information 
security does not bring about direct business benefits such as revenue generation or cost savings.  This 
assumption seems plausible at first, because the main objective for security measures is to prevent 
adverse event from happening.  Recent studies, however, shed light on possible business values that 
such investments would bring to an organization.  It is found that, for instance, IT security can 
enhance a company’s knowledge management process (Jennex and Zyngier, 2007) and instil 
confidence in its reputation and brand (Emory, 2007).  Further, information security efforts improve 
and sustain a company’s resiliency, allowing it to better adopt to ever changing risk environment 
(Daneva, 2006) and, thus, potentially advancing its competitive advantage (Wang, 2004).  To address 
this gap, the current project takes a business-value approach to address the following issues: 
(i) How can business benefits from information security be formulated? 
(ii) How can both risk reduction and business benefits be accounted for in optimizing a firm’s 
information security investment? 
(ii) How does the optimal level of investment based on business value behave with respect to 
environmental parameters such as connectivity, potential loss, and attack probability? 
 
3.  BASE MODEL—RISK MANAGEMENT APPROACH 
 The commonly adopted model (Huang et al., 2008; Gordon and Loeb, 2002a) examines the 
attack based on the breach probability and expected loss.  Security adversaries generate attacks on the 
information systems with a threat probability t.  In turn, the security property of the information 
systems is determined by the system vulnerability and security investment.  The system vulnerability, 
v, is assumed to be a direct result of the topology and connectivity of the firm’s information systems: 
The more accessible and connected the systems, the more intrinsically susceptible they are to attacks.  
To protect against the system vulnerability being exploited by threat agents, the firm invests S in 
security measures.  The probability of a security breach to occur can then be considered as a function 
of the behavior of the attack agents, as described by the threat probability, and the security property of 
the information systems, which, in this model, is determined by the system vulnerability and 
investments in security measures.  In other words, the breach probability p can be written as the 
following: 
 ),,( Svtpp = .  (1) 
For simplicity, we require that both t and v to be between 0 and 1.  Note that for any given system, the 
higher the security threat and the more susceptible to attacks, the higher breach probability; that is, 
both 0≥∂
∂
t
p
 and 0≥∂
∂
v
p
.  Further, the effect of the security investment is to reduce the breach 
probability, or 
 0≤∂
∂
S
p
. (2) 
We assume that this reduction is governed by the law of diminishing return, which implies that 
 02
2
≥∂
∂
S
p
. (3)  
We also require the following boundary condition tvvtp =)0,,( .  That is, when the firm does not 
make any security investment, the breach probability is solely determined by and can be described as 
a product of the threat and the intrinsic system vulnerability. 
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A common definition of risk is the combination of the likelihood and the consequence of a specified 
hazard being realized (Schechter, 2005).  The security risk R the firm faces can therefore be written as 
 LpR = , (4) 
where L is potential economic loss caused by a security breach.  For this model, one can make the 
simplifying assumption that L > 0 is a fixed amount, as estimated by the firm based on the type of 
attack.  From the boundary condition tvvtp =)0,,( , the security risk a company faces when no 
investment is made is tvL.  To protect against the attack, the firm makes investment S to reduce the 
breach probability such that the information security risks is reduced by L)( ptvR −=Δ . In other 
words, the net benefit Π of the security investments would be 
 SptvvtS −−=Π L)(),,( . (5) 
The task of optimizing the security investments is to maximize their benefits by setting the first-order 
partial differentiation of Π in (5) with respect to S to 0; that is, .0=∂
Π∂
S
  Note that this operation 
indeed yields maximum, not minimum, of Π: 
 0L2
2
2
2
≤∂
∂−=∂
Π∂
S
p
S
, (6) 
because of (3). 
 To further account for breach probability p, a derivation that has its root in scale-free 
networks is adopted (Albert et al., 1999; Faloutsos et al., 1999; Kumar et al., 2000).   It has been 
shown that the connectedness of the Internet and the worldwide web resembles that of a scale-free, 
small-world network, distinguished by a limited number of highly connected nodes (called “hubs”) as 
well as by its structural independence of the system’s size N (Barabási and Albert, 1999; Watts and 
Strogatz, 1998).  In a scale-free network, the probability that a node connects with k other nodes is 
roughly proportional to k-γ, where γ is between 2 and 3 for most real networks such as the Internet 
(Barabási and Albert, 1999). 
 To examine how the scale free network can shed light on the directed attacks, the case that an 
epidemic event starts spreading in a scale-free network (Chang and Young, 2005; Pastor-Satorras and 
Vespignani, 2001) is used.  The rate of epidemic spreading, λ, is determined by r, the infection rate of 
a previously uninfected node if it is connected to an infected one, and δ, the remediation rate of an 
infected node: 
 δλ
r= . (7) 
Let Pk (t) denote the relative density of infected nodes with k connections—that is the probability that 
a node with k connections is infected—at time t.  The mean field rate equation gives (Pastor-Satorras 
and Vespignani, 2001) 
 )()](1[)(
)( λλ Θ−+−=∂
∂ tPktP
t
tP
kk
k , (8) 
where Θ(λ) is the probability that any given connection points to an infected node, which can be 
given in the lowest order of λ (Chang and Young, 2005): 
 
n
e n
λλ
λ−
=Θ )( , (9) 
where n is the minimum number of nodes available for connection in such a network.  Solving for Pk  
in a steady state (i.e., 0)( =∂
∂
t
tPk ), one gets 
 
)(1
)(
λλ
λλ
Θ+
Θ=
k
kPk . (10) 
When averaging Pk over k, one gets the average infection probability of any node in the network 
(Pastor-Satorras and Vespignani, 2001): 
 nceP λ
1−= , (11) 
447
where c is a normalization constant.   
 To extend this result to security investment of the firm’s information systems, it is assumed 
that the firm’s information systems can be represented as a node in such a network.  Further, it is 
assumed that the effect of security investment S can be shown in the reduction of the infection rate λ 
in (9).  λ and S satisfy certain boundary conditions. First, the attack would be spread freely to the node 
without any security investment; in other words, λ = 1 when S = 0.  Second, any finite security 
investments, no matter how large, would never be able to fully block all attacks; in other words,  λ → 
0 only when S → ∞.  Without loss of generality, a linear inverse relationship between security 
investment and infection rate can be used.   Such relationship with the above boundary conditions can 
be expressed in the following manner: 
 
1
1
+≡ Sκλ , (12) 
where κ, normalized to between 0 and 1, is a scaling factor for S: The higher the κ, the greater 
reduction of the infection rate for any given security investment S.   
The next set of observations is on the system vulnerability v.  Note that since v represents the 
connectivity of the information systems in question, v would be strictly increasing in n, which 
represents the extent of connections in such a scale-free network.  Further, when n = 0, v = 0.  On the 
other hand, v → 1 when n → ∞; that is, the systems are highly vulnerable to the epidemic, or security 
attacks in our case, when they are completely open.  Without loss of generality, the following 
relationship between c and n that satisfies all the above conditions is assigned: 
 nev
1−≡ . (13) 
Lastly, note that the level of threat from attacks is not explicitly considered in (11), which can be 
accounted for by multiplying (11) with the attack probability t.  With this modification, (12) and (13), 
and adjusting the normalization constant β to reflect the boundary condition tvvtp =)0,,( , one finds 
that the breach probability for an opportunistic attack can be written as: 
 1
1
1 +− =⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛⋅=⋅= Sn tvetPtp κλ . (14) 
Substituting (14) into (5) and rearranging the terms, one gets 
 SvtvLvtS S −−=Π )1(),,( κ , (15) 
which is the base expression governing the net benefit of security investment amid targeted attacks.  
All the existing studies in the stream of economic analysis of information security investment research, 
including Gordon and Loeb (2002a), Hauske (2006), Huang et al. (2006), and Huang et al. (2008), are 
based on (15) or its variations. 
 
4.  EXTENDED MODEL—BUSINESS VALUE APPROACH 
 In this project, the existing research stream is extended to consider the business value as the 
basis for security investment.  We posit that, in addition to reducing security risks, as represented in 
L)( ptvR −=Δ , the security investment S also generate direct business benefits, be they competitive 
advantage, customer trust, brand loyalty, or some other form, or a combination of them.  Let B 
denotes such business benefits generated from firm’s information security, then (15) can be modified 
as follows: 
 SvtvLB S −−+=Π )1( κ , (16) 
With the addition of the business benefits function, (16) represents the total business value of 
information security investment that firm is making.  To find the optimal level of investment, one can 
set the derivative of the business value (16) with respect to S to zero: 
 0)(ln 1
**
=−∂
∂=∂
Π∂ +
==
XS
SSSS
Lvvt
S
B
S
κκ . (17) 
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A further check shows that 02
2
≤∂
Π∂
S
when 02
2
≤∂
∂
S
B
(see (i) below), and S* is indeed the solution 
that maximizes Π(S,t,v).  Therefore, once the explicit form of B is known, one can use equation (17) 
to solve for S* as the optimal level of security investment that maximizes a firm’s business value. 
 The key to successfully take this business value approach is to identify the properties and, 
ideally, the appropriate functional forms of B.  To start with, note that B depends on both the level of 
investment and the connectivity of the particular business network; in other words, B = B(v, S).  
Further, the function B has to satisfy the following properties: 
 (i) Business benefits, which are derived from information security, need to be an increasing 
function of security investment with diminishing importance.  In other words, 
 0,0 2
2
≤∂
∂≥∂
∂
S
B
S
B
. (18) 
 (ii) Business benefits derived from security investment should be higher when the firm’s 
connectivity is higher: 
 0≥∂
∂
v
B
. (19) 
 (iii) When the firm is not connected to any other information systems, its vulnerability is zero, 
and so are the business benefits for any security investment: 
 SSvB
v
∀=→ ,0),(lim0 . (20) 
 (iv) When the firm’s vulnerability is very high, there is a finite limit of business benefits that 
can be achieved no matter how much investment is made to protect its information security.  In other 
words, 
 ∞<=→∞→  Bˆ),(limlim 1 SvBvS . (21) 
 An initial examination, taking into account the above constraints, show that the behavior of an 
S-curve may be a reasonable form for B, suggesting a Fisher-Pry function or a Gumpertz function.  
However, further research is need to verify and validate such initial observations, as the proper form 
of B is critical to the behavior of S*, the optimal level of investment. 
 
5.  PROJECT STRUCTURE 
 This project is well underway, with all the mathematical modelling done.  The following 
describes the next steps to complete this project: 
 
5.1 Determination of the properties and forms of business benefits function   
Because the function B cannot be found in existing literature, it will have to be defined based on 
available theories, related studies, existing data, and simulation.  We will employ various theoretical 
forms of B (S-curve functions included), run simulation, and compare the functional behavior with 
data presented in studies such as those by Daneva (2006), Martin (2006), and Jennex and Zyngier 
(2007).  We have also recruited two local firms to provide me with some operational data and to 
examine the results critically. 
5.2 Analysis of the optimal investment   
With B defined, we can solve for optimal investment S* in (17).  We can then analyze the behavior of 
the optimal solution with respect to key parameters such as firm’s connectivity, attack probability, 
effectiveness of security measures, and potential loss due to security breaches.  Such analyses would 
produce rich theoretical and practical insights into how firms should decide on security investments 
under various conditions.  (If no closed form of S* can be obtained, one can use implicit function and 
simulation to obtain such insights.) 
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5.3 Validation of model and analysis   
Validation is a nontrivial, yet important, step of research based on analytics.  For the current project 
we will use the aforementioned local firms as case studies to compare their experience with the 
project result.  Simulation of the optimal investment with respect to different environmental 
parameters will be produced for such examinations, and the comparison results will be reported in the 
final paper. 
 
6.  CONTRIBUTION 
 This study extends the current research stream of the economics of information security 
investment by taking the business value approach to determining a firm’s security investment.  In 
doing so, it make theoretical contribution to the research stream, alleviating the limitation on all the 
studies thus far to consider risk and risk reduction as the only economic impact of security investment 
on a firm’s business.   In addition, by explicitly accounting for the business benefits function, the 
formulation would provide a baseline for the future research on such economic analysis of 
information security investment.  In practice, the results would offer insight into the behavior of 
optimal investment with respect to various environment parameters, assisting practitioners in making 
decisions on how much and where to make investments to protect firm’s information security while 
increasing the business values. 
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